Europaische WirtschaftsGemeinschaft

BEING in Translation:
EUropean Economic Community

Von:
ReichsWirtschaftMinister u. President der Deutschen ReichsBank Funk;
Professor Dr. Jecht, Berlin; Professor Dr. Woermann, Halle;
Dr. Reithinger, Berlin; MinisterialDirektor Dr. Benning, Berlin;
Gesandter Dr. Clodius, Berlin, und GauWirtschaftsBerater Professor
Dr. Hunke, Berlin

Mit einer EinFuhrung von:
GauWirtschaftsBerater Professor Dr. Heinrich Hunke
President des Vereins Berliner Kaufleute und Industrieller

HerausGeGeben von dem
Verein Berliner Kaufleute        und der        Wirtschafts – HochSchule
Und Industrieller                                                                        Berlin

Published
BERLIN 1942
Second edition 1943
Haude & Spenesche VerlagsBuchHandlung Max Paschke

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
To assist non Germans, reading the above, certain letters have been capitalised for convenience ONLY
Pamphlet #08

Europaische WirtschaftsGemeinschaft

BEING in Translation:
EUropean Economic Community

Von:
ReichsWirtschaftMinister u. President der Deutschen ReichsBank Funk;
Professor Dr. Jecht, Berlin; Professor Dr. Woermann, Halle;
Dr. Reithinger, Berlin; MinisterialDirektor Dr. Benning, Berlin;
Gesandter Dr. Clodius, Berlin, und GauWirtschaftsBerater Professor
Dr. Hunke, Berlin

Mit einer EinFuhrung von:
GauWirtschaftsBerater Professor Dr. Heinrich Hunke
President des Vereins Berliner Kaufleute und Industrieller

HerausGeGeben von dem
Verein Berliner Kaufleute        und der        Wirtschafts – HochSchule
Und Industrieller                                                                        Berlin

Published
BERLIN 1942
Second edition
1943
Haude & Spenesche VerlagsBuchHandlung Max Paschke

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
To assist non Germans, reading the above, certain letters have been capitalised for convenience ONLY

Pamphlet #08
Being the EIGHTH of a series of Pamphlets being published on the internet at: www.SilentMajority.co.UK/EUroRealist/Germany1942
Greg Lance-Watkins, who has overseen this project for SilentMajority over the last few years would like to thank ALL those who have helped in tracking down the original full text in German, and the short term acquisition thereof, for photocopying., Also for the lengthy process of accurate translation and independent checking of the translation work.
The original copy is available for inspection at Glance Back Books in Chepstow.

The final pamphlet in the series will contain ALL the maps and relevant charts, together with a brief summary of the document.
The European Economic Community 

Mr. Funk, the Reich’s Economic Minister and President of the German Reichsbank

Professor Dr. Jecht, Berlin

Professor Dr. Woermann, Halle

Dr. Reithinger, Berlin, Ministerial Director

Dr. Beisiegel, Berlin

Secretary of State Königs, Berlin

Director Dr. Benning, Berlin

Ambassador Dr. Clodius, Berlin and Economics Committee Advisor

Professor Dr. Hunke, Berlin

With an introduction by

Economics Committee Advisor, Professor Dr. Heinrich Hunke, President of the Society of Berlin Industry and Commerce

Issued by

The Society of Berlin Industry and Commerce and the Berlin School of Economics

Second Revised Edition (Berlin 1943)

Haude and Spenersche Publishing House Max Paschke

Preface to the First and Second Edition

This text contains the lectures presented under the title “The European Economic Community” by the Society of Berlin Industry and Commerce at the start of 1942 in conjunction with the Economic Advisor to the Berlin Committee of the NSDAP and The Chamber of Trade and Industry.  The order of lectures was as follows:

•	Walter Funk, Reichs Economic Minister and President of the Reichsbank:
“The Economic Face of the New Europe”

•	Dr. Horst Jecht, Professor at The Berlin School of Economics:
“Developments towards the European Economic Community”

•	Dr. Emil Woermann, Professor at Halle University:  
“European Agriculture”

•	Dr. Anton Reithinger, Director of the Economics Department of I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., Berlin: 
“The European Industrial Economy”

•	Dr. Philipp Beisiegel, Ministerial Director of the Reich’s Labour Ministry:
 “The Deployment of Labour in Europe”

•	Gustav Koenigs, Secretary of State, Berlin: 
“Questions About European Transport”

•	Dr. Bernhard Benning, Director of the Reich’s Credit Company, Berlin: 
“Questions About Europe’s Currency”

•	Dr. Carl Clodius, Ambassador of the Foreign Office:
 “European Trade and Economic Agreements’’

•	Professor Dr. Heinrich Hunke, Economic Committee Advisor of the NSDAP, President of Germany’s Economic Publicity Agency and the Berlin Society of Industry and Commerce: 
“The Basic Question: Europe - Geographical Concept or Political Fact?”

The lectures met with considerable interest and very strong agreement. On account of this, we feel we should make them available to a wider circle of people.
Berlin, September 1942

The Society of Berlin’s Trade and Industry - The President: Professor Dr. Heinrich Hunke, Advisor to the Economics Committee

The Berlin School of Economics - The Rector: Dr. Edwin Fels, Professor of Geography

	Index	Page	
Preface		  2	
Hunke	Introduction	  8	
	The Discussion So Far and its Results 	  8	
	Economic Practice	  9	
	Problems Related to Economic Community of Continental Europe             	 10	
PAMPHLET #01			
Funk	The Economic Face of the New Europe    	 15	
	Real and False Economic Freedom 	 15	
	Co-operation in Continental Europe	 18	
	Europe’s Resources and Completion 	 20	
	Directing of the Economy by the State and Work 
                     between the States of the Community	 22	
	The Movement of Payments between the States and European Currency Issues	 24	
	Securing the Area and Economy of Europe	 27 	
	The Will for Co-operation in the Economic Community               	 28	
PAMPHLET #02			
Jecht	Developments towards the European Economic Community 	 30	
	The European Economic Community and its Enlargement    	 30	
	The Problem of the European Economic Area in Late Antiquity and 
                                                                                            the Middle Ages	 31	
	Recent Changes to the Problem of the Area of Europe 	 33	
	The Formation of the Nations and Independent Economies  	 33	
	Overseas Expansion and its Consequences for Europe       	 34	
	The Release of England from the Continent and the Formation of the 
                                                                                  “Free Global Economy”	 35	
	Europe’s Economic New Order: The Present Task                             	 37	
	Collapse of the Previous World Economy	 38	
	Means and Objectives of the European Economic Community        	 39	
	Outlook                                                  	 41	
PAMPHLET #03			
Woermann	European Agriculture                           	 42	
	The Development of Agricultural Enterprises and 
                                             the Structure of  Europe’s Food Economy 	 42	
	The Formation of the Division of Labour in World Agriculture                  	 47	
	Production Increase in Germany and Italy                                       	 49	
	The Supply Situation under the Influence of Economic Restrictions and Change                                                                    	 50	
	Political Consequences for Production                                               	 52	
	Possibilities of Increasing Europe’s Food Production 	 53	
PAMPHLET #04			
Reithinger	The European Industrial Economy                                   	 59	
	The Development of Industry in the 19th Century                              	 59	
	Stages of Technical and Economic Development                             	 60	
	Socio-Political Effects                                                                       	 60 	
	The Loss of Europe’s Hegemony in the World War                        	 61	
	The Transition to State Direction and Planning                              	 62	
	New Europe and its Shared Features                                             	 64	
	Regional Differences in Europe                                            	 66	
	The Major Powers at War - A Comparison of their Capabilities                 	 68	
PAMPHLET #05			
Beisiegel	The Deployment of Labour in Europe                           	 71	
	Population Density, Number and Structure of the Employed  	 71	
	People - The Wealth of Europe                                                                       	 72	
	Worker Exchange on the Basis of Inter-State Agreements            	 75	
	Adaptation of the Organisation for Labour Deployment      	 78	
	Employer Action and Order Switching   	 79 	
PAMPHLET #06			
Koenigs	Questions about European Transport                               	 81	
	“Technical Unity” in the Railway System	 82	
	The Magna Carta of Europe’s Internal Riverboat Traffic	 84	
	Motorways’ Contribution to the European Transport Community	 87	
	Community Work in Shipping                                                             	 88	
	Joint Work in Air Traffic                                                                    	 89	
PAMPHLET #07			
Benning	Questions about Europe’s Currency                                   	 91	
	Currency’s Two Sides                                                                         	 91	
	The Internal Economic Situation of Europe’s Currencies  	 92	
	Managing Foreign Exchange and Bilateral Settlements   	 92	
	Development of Multi-Lateral Settlements                                           	 94	
	The Problem of the Clearing Balances                                              	 95	
	Adjustment of Europe’s Exchange Rates                                          	 96	
	Future Formation of the European Currency System    	 97	
	Europe’s Future Currency Relationship to the Currencies of Other Major Nations 	 99 	
	What about Gold?                              	100	
	The European Currency Bloc                                                              	101 	
PAMPHLET #08			
Clodius	European Trade and Economic Treaties                                  	102	
	The Period of the Old Trade Policy                                                        	102	
	German Economic and Trade Policy since 1933                                      	103	
	Changes to Trade Policy Caused by the War                                          	105	
	The Reversal of the Law of Supply and Demand                                   	106	
	The Question of Labour Deployment in Europe                                         	106	
	The Problem of Traffic                                                                             	106	
	Effects of the English Blockade on Europe                                               	106	
	Principles of European Co-operation                                                           	107	
	The European Regional Principle                                                                 	107	
	Europe’s Economic Independence                                                               	107	
	Europe and the Global Economy                                                                	108	
	Internal Preconditions of a European Economic Community                  	109	
	Ways to Achieve European Co-operation                                                     	111	
PAMPHLET #09			
Hunke	The Basic Question: Europe – Geographical Concept or Political Fact?      	113	
	New Learning and Thought                                                                            	113	
	Starting Point for European Task 	114	
	Three Eras                                                                                                        	114	
	The Character of the Global Economy                                                          	114	
	Political Weakness of Continental Europe due to the Idea of 
                                                                         English World Superiority      	116	
	Britain’s Dominant Theory about the Modern National Economy	117	
	The Foundation of the European Economic Community                                     	118	
	Categories within the European Economic Community                                              	119	
	Three Principles                                                                                               	119	
	A New Era                                                                                                        	121	
	Taking a Look Back to the Past and to the Future               	123	
PAMPHLET #10
	The Illustrations – Maps, Charts etc. Summary of the series and Comments
	Request for help locating further FACTS
		Including Reinhard Heydrich’s 1942 Reichs Plan for The Domination
of EUrope – published in Berlin in 1942 believed to have been November.
ALSO – details of the Berlin Conference of 1944 Titled ‘How Will Germany Dominate The 
Peace, When It Loses The War.’ & details of the massive amounts of cash moved 
out of Germany during the war to safeguard the future of German domination against the economic collapse of losing the Second World War against EUropean Union. AND connections with organisations like The Bilderbergers, Council for Foreign relations, Tri Lateral Commission and other arms of the New World Order.

Introduction - by Professor Dr. Heinrich Hunke, Economic Committee Adviser to the NSDAP, President of Germany’s Economic Publicity Agency

Around the end of 1939, most of Europe was either consciously or unconsciously under the influence of the economic concept of England.  Over recent years, however, it has been swept out of European countries, politically, militarily and economically.  Politically the three-power pact has given honour once again to the ancient figures of life, people and room.  It has also established a natural order and a neighbourly way of co-existing as the ideal of the new order.  The foundation of English economics, which is the basis of the balance of powers, has been militarily destroyed.  And economically, a change has come about following the political and military development, the shape of which is easy to describe, but whose final significance is very difficult to evaluate.  I can only repeat, that the changing order that is happening now has to be ranked as one of the greatest economic revolutions in history.  It signifies a reversion of the economy of Europe to a time before the English concept of building an overseas Europe, i.e. an awareness of one’s own country.

The Discussion so far and its Results

Discussions about questions relating to Europe started as the power of the NSADP grew.  At the Congress of Europe in Rome from 14th to 20th November 1932, Alfred Rosenberg developed, for the first time in front of an international forum, thoughts and ideas that have moved us since.  No one, who fights for a new economic order in Europe, can ignore these perceptions and conclusions.  The economic and political wheel was set in motion, when the NSDAP declared the militarisation of the German economy.  It is to the credit of the journal ‘Germany’s Economy’ that it first seized these questions in 1932, kept on bringing them up and stuck doggedly to those original perceptions.  The idea of German economic self- sufficiency in the new political sense and the German economic militarisation are synonymous with this journal.  Besides this, Daitz, the ambassador, has earned the special credit of being the first to have related German economic history to the present time.  Part II of his selected speeches and essays, which appeared in 1938 under the title ‘Germany and the European Economy’, summarizes his concepts formed between 1932 and 1938.  The Italian, Carlo Scarfoglio, delivered with his book ‘England and the Continental Mainland’, a decisive historical contribution to the consciousness of the European continent.  Meanwhile German and Italian economic policy drew the political consequences from the historical lessons that were learnt during the blockade and learnt again during the sanctions.  The speech made in Munich in 1939 by the leader of the Reich’s farmers, R. Walther Darre, at the 6th Great Lecture at the Commission of Economic Policy of the NSDAP, takes a special place in the discussion at that time.  Its theme was “The market order of the National-Socialist agricultural policy - setting the pace for a new foreign trade order.”

While our leader maintained the hope of reaching a peaceful agreement with England, the route for European economic unity remained problematic.  The end of 1939 was a decisive point and it was natural that the years 1940-1941 heralded the new economic and political order.  The writer, in particular, developed and extended in speech and writing the intellectual fund of the new economic policy, which has been translated into most languages, so that today everywhere the great constructive texts are known.  These contexts revolve around the following issues:

1.	Theory about the Reich and the European economy.

2.	The historic, cultural, and economic significance of the German economic order.

3.	The foundations of the future economic relationships between the states.

4.	The nature of the European economic community.

On 25th June 1940 the Reich’s Economic Minister, Funk, publicised in his official capacity his thoughts, which underlined the development so far and thus gave them state sanction.  In October, the journal ‘German Economy’ summarised for the first time the principles of European co-operation, the fundamental principles of German foreign trade, Germany’s export economy and ways and means of promoting export.  It did so in a popular review “About A New Europe”, providing an overview of the important problem of European economic fusion.  Around the end of 1940 the Berlin historian Fritz Rorig finally outlined in his book “Hanseatic Essence” the historical foundations of the greatest economic and political achievement by the Germans.

I am clear in my mind that total clarity is to be found in the principle questions: The necessity is recognised for a political order for the economic co-operation of the people.  The nature of the new order which is: awareness of tradition, using up one’s own economic resources, long term economic agreements and fair relations, is affirmed.  The economic inter-dependence is underlined by fate.  The economic unity of Europe is thus evident.

Economic Practice

Even practical economic life has increasingly allowed entry to new thoughts.  I am able to see the decisive steps in the start and realisation of the following points:

1.	In the increasing payment traffic through Berlin.

2.	In the exchange of experiences in various areas of economic life.   Thereto belong also the statements of ministers and business people, the calls made by special advisers and the collective tackling of important tasks relating to the economy.  Even the specialist is surprised, once he has taken the trouble to put together all the connections.  Today they are already legion.

3.	In the signing of long term economic agreements between the Reich and the other European states, which the public is aware of.  There can be no doubt that such agreements are those of the future.  

Of course, that cannot prevent unclear points and new problems from arising, which become evident at the time when the situation is reviewed.

Problems Related to the Economic Community of Continental Europe

These unclear points primarily relate to the concept of economic direction, the extent of solidarity and neighbourly attitude, the development of one’s own powers, the care to maintain the standard of living and the question of raw material purchase from foreign countries. It is natural that one or another issue will take priority of interest, depending on the set of conditions that prevail.  It should be attempted at this point to give a reply, albeit a summary one.

There can be no doubt that the concept of direction of the economy, or rather its leadership, is as novel as it is revolutionary.  Its classification is all the more important, as the fate and consequence of European co-operation depend principally on a new consistent form of economic understanding.  The Anglo-Saxon view of economics is dead: consequently, even the so-called ‘classical’ national economy is no longer classical, but it has survived.   So what it comes down to is that a new understanding arises to do with ideology and terminology, which represents a sound basis for agreement and co-operation.  Relating to this, one must point out the following in detail:

1.	Economic direction is not a momentary emergency solution, instead it forms the core of new theory and practice.  First of all, it takes the place of individual egotism and the automatic autonomy of the Anglo-Saxon precept.

2.	Economic direction is not identical to the tendencies of a centrally planned economy.  It does not seek to cancel the individual or to administer through the state operators.

3.	Economic direction really means the following: the new instruction of the creative and constructive power of the individual in relation to the whole system; the creation of a consistent economic view and an attitude towards the economy; the selection of important tasks through political leadership and the state’s final decision on all questions about economic power.  Beyond this, the economy is free and responsible to itself.  

The degree of solidarity of the individual economies and their neighbourly attitude is characterised by three guidelines: 

Firstly, it is limited in regard to its own economic development by the recognition that the utilisation of individual resources represents not only a requirement of the new economic precept, but is the very foundation for economic activity.  The European economic community has no interest in leaving any abilities or possibilities unutilised.  

Secondly, it contains the obligation that, because of Europe’s freedom, consideration is given firstly to continental Europe regarding any matter related to economic activity.  Not only should the shared fate of the European people be emphasized, but the fact should also be stressed that the supplementation of the European economies beyond their borders is possible and sought after.

Thirdly, it must be maintained that, above all else, the spirit of the individual economies may not be allowed to go against the spirit of neighbourly co-operation.

The question of developing one’s own powers refers to the problem of monocultures, of industrialisation of the agrarian south-east and the awakening of new needs.

An answer can easily be given to the first question.  Monocultures are the result of the same economic precept that made the world market price the determining factor in the economy.  According to that precept, people and land are the vestiges of some by-gone age.  Europe is well on the way to destroying these monocultures with initiatives ranging from land improvements and growing new crops to discovering new local resources.  All these have the same aim, which is to develop the economy and broaden its basis.  Germany and the whole of Europe can only greet these efforts with gratitude.

The industrialisation of the south-east poses a particular problem regarding these questions.  As I am unable to handle this problem - like all other problems - here in a comprehensive and exhaustive manner, because the industrialisation of economies is theoretically a difficult problem, I can only say as follows:

1.	Just as it is in the nature of things that each country will strive to utilise its available resources for its own production, so will there will be a knock-on effect for other economic partners.

2.	If, as is the case in the South-east European countries, there is heavy 
over-population in the countryside, then there are only three possibilities to solve it: itinerant workers, a permanent emigration and an ‘intensivisation’ of the local economy, a term correctly created by Dr. Ilgner for the problem of industrialisation.  Itinerant workers can only form a part solution.  Besides, it only applies to agricultural and construction workers and gone on for ages.  Permanent emigration from Europe is just as false as impossible.  There just remains the intensivisation of the economies of south-east Europe as the way to self-help.

3.   The economies should make it possible for an independent life according to the modern economic view.  The intensivisation of their economies therefore is right for the time.

4.   The old features of industrialisation, which evolved from the price collapses in countries with agriculture and raw materials, have to now belong to the past.  Europe is a communal living area.  Only through a joint development of economies - and not through independence from one another - can protection against crises be achieved.

5.    The tasks that have to be solved in Europe are so big that the powers needed to do so have to be released by an intensivisation of the individual economies.  This can be easily done by employing the workers that have been liberated in new branches of the economy.

Without affecting the difficult questions of purchasing power, it can be regarded as proven that the joint work to build up Germany’s and the south-eastern states’ in the area of industrialisation lies in the direction of the intensivation of interest of the whole continent.  

One important and until now completely overlooked task in this regard exists and that is the awakening of new needs in the south-eastern countries.  It is because, in those countries, wealth has grown and will gradually continue to grow, as a result of the reliable purchase of agricultural products and available raw materials at adequate price levels.  According to the principle in economics that giving equals taking, peoples’ living habits there will have to change, otherwise one day the process will come to a halt.  Germany’s ability to absorb the products from the south-east is practically infinite, whereas creating a demand for German goods there is not only a matter for economic intensivation but also one of modifying the people so they consume more.  This task is of such importance that it has to be considered from the very outset, so that the south-eastern European economies are elevated after the war.

Equally important as the industrialisation of south-east Europe is the question of the standard of living in the north.  Their economic development and high standard of living, which underpin their lives though all economic conditions, should not be mistaken.  This standard of living has grown considerably during the 19th century and around the time of the world war due to free trade, so that various circles view world economic events with particular concern.  From a German viewpoint, only the following points can be made:

Firstly, a higher standard of living is also the aim of the German government. The German people not only understand this well, but also through its fight wants to ensure European civilisation and culture.  This fight will benefit the whole of Europe, and with it the north.

Secondly, despite being connected successfully to England and its economic system (one should not ignore the countless economic troughs that feature there), the economies of the north whose fate and greatness are very closely linked to Germany.

Thirdly, the northern states’ difficulties are going through a temporary phase of adjustment.  In the long term, this will bring about a lasting advancement, rather than destruction, for their economies’ foundations.

Maintaining a high standard of living is not an insoluble problem.  To finish, I now come to the problem of purchasing raw materials from overseas markets.  A leading south-east European economist once wrote about this principal question: “Unlike the war, we were in the following situation: in order to import raw materials from overseas countries, we bought goods from west European countries with foreign exchange.  In the area of continental Europe there is no gold.  Everything had to pass through the system of clearing - goods sold against goods. We have no product that can be sold to North or South America.  That means that the leading nations are obliged to acquire and distribute to us the raw materials that we need.  The leading nations of Europe can supply, with its capacity, enough products to overseas countries with which to acquire raw materials.  The one question is whether exchange will ever happen… Even before the new order is introduced, and without even joining in with the Axis powers, we stand in solidarity outside Europe with its traffic of goods…”

We can only agree with this view, leaving the matter open, as the Reich’s Economic Minister Funk described, how large the direct sources of help will be and whether raw material acquisition from overseas will take place through the system of clearing or free flow of currency.  With the introduction of the multi-lateral clearing system, on a practical level there is no change from the pre-war time.  As this learned person said, “All the benefits of the method of paying are regained from the system of free currency.”  Nor can it be realised - contrary to him - that this system of clearing through Berlin should function without those countries outside the European system. But the decisive factor is the way in which the continent is bound to Germany and Italy by one fate.

Since 1940, therefore, we are faced with an unparalleled economic and political revolution.  The problems created for us are large but can be solved.  Their solution will give Europe the peace it yearns for and will bring a great era of joint development.  It is worth fighting and working for this. 

 The following discourses should contribute to helping us to broaden and deepen our understanding of the tasks and nature of the European economic community.

European Trade and Economic Treaties - by Dr. Carl Clodius, Ambassador of the Foreign Office, Berlin,

The Period of the Old Trade Policy

Trade policy has undergone major changes in the last 20-30 years, which up to 1914 was used to describe the settling of basic economic issues between individual economies.  Around the turn of the century, a classic type of treaty only covered three important areas: right of settlement i.e. the individual’s right to trade freely, duty issues and transport issues, especially shipping ones. The trade treaty was not generally decisive for the shaping of economic relationships, but there were some, which actually had quite radical effects, such as the German-Austrian Treaty at the start of the century.  The development of economic relationships between two countries was, in general, not affected significantly by trade treaties.  Of course, a good treaty could strengthen one of the partners and vice-versa.  In any case, the function or type of these treaties scarcely determined the overall functioning of economic life.

The first major change came in 1914 when all participants in the war became interested in having state control of their economic relationships.  This entailed allowing exports of vital goods and the import of non-vital ones for the war.

Chaotic years followed the war in the absence of practical trade policies until 1924.  Europe’s economic fate then was determined by Germany.  It is a remarkable omen that it was not clear, at first, to those at the time that even the vanquished Germany was not strong enough yet to make an impact on Europe.  From 1918 onwards, Europe’s economic development depended on Germany, not England or France.  Europe’s economy remained sick as long as its heart was sick, as long as economic chaos prevailed in Germany, and as long as the drift towards economic catastrophe remained a possibility.  The first step towards recovery was the creation of the stabilised Mark in 1923. From 1924 onwards, there began a normal period of international economic relationships, particularly in Europe.

Between 1924 and 1929-30 there was the temporary impression that these relationships would revert to the methods and structure of pre-World War I times.  Germany’s treaty with Italy in 1925 was the first one it ever signed with a major nation on the basis of economic equality and its outline was not so different from one of the classic treaties of pre-war times.  The same is true of the treaty with France in 1927.  At the centre of these treaties was the institution of the customs office with which one expected to control the flow of goods between countries.

The second major collapse came with the world economic crisis precipitated by the crisis at the New York Stock Exchange in November 1928, followed by the collapse of the Credit Institute in Vienna and of a major Berlin bank in 1931.  Then came the most visible expression of collapse with the depreciation of the English Pound in September 1931.  What has been termed as the world economic crisis was brought to an end by a world leading powers’ decision to devalue, which was followed by lots of other countries, leading quickly to the formation of the so-called Sterling bloc. 

It was at this time in 1931 that the period of old trade policy (i.e. control by treaty of basic principles while leaving the rest to free initiative) came to an end and never to return. It is a vain exercise trying to prophesise about precise facts but I still would like to say that the possibility of such a period returning is not very strong.  They, whose responsibility it is to direct political relationships, need to consider how to replace these original methods, concepts and structures.  I do not share the view that theoretical plans can solve international or European economic problems.  Adolf Hitler’s Germany has constantly refused to attend international conferences and participate in any collective solutions since 1933.  Our 15 years’ negative experience in the People’s Federation in Geneva took away our desire to revert to those methods and so I believe that Europe’s future shape will not have its economic programme decided at a conference with 75 or 93 delegates.  Instead the European nations will slowly arrive at a closer alliance and a clear picture will emerge from a number of individual treaties between nations.

It is important that each decision is made taking into account the requirements of the day and, especially now, those of the war.  What must, though, emerge from it all is a line, a policy, a programme and a new future for Europe.  This is the only safe and practical way to reach a concrete result, while avoiding discussions about theories, principles, possibilities etc.  What actually shapes things is what one does on a daily basis in practice.

German Economic and Trade Policy since 1933

The methods have changed since 1931, when England chose to devalue and Germany, in its way, chose to create a controlled economy.  The first steps were made with the 1933 takeover by the National Socialists.  The first systems for payment and foreign currency control were created by the central European countries and around the same time Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria carried out the first foreign currency regulations.  Then Germany signed the first settlement agreements with its friends and neighbours in central Europe.

The basis of the payment agreement was simply that each partner makes a transfer in his country and then each account is credited or debited, as long as the amounts balance and the same amount is transferred.  However, it becomes more complicated as the gap between the two countries’ trade performance grows.

Before, it was possible for free foreign currency to be used for balancing out purposes.  If I sign twenty treaties with twenty countries, then some of them will temporarily have to suffer and that is why, immediately after the transfer system was introduced, it was necessary to introduce bridging finance.  There are also many possibilities to balance out by triangular clearings between three countries.

This transfer system, which was constantly extended from 1931 onwards, showed that good things can come out of bad.  The controlled economy, which we introduced in 1933, relies, as far as Germany’s relationship with other countries is concerned, on the control of the transfer system.  For this, it is necessary that state measures are taken so that the value of exports and imports remain close to each other or, at least, that imports do not exceed exports.

After 1933 the firm execution of such a system was one of the main foundations of the Reich’s internal German economic policy.  It is an old law that says a burgeoning economy tends to attract imports and to impede exports and vice-versa.  As a result, a country that has high unemployment and is going through a bad depression internally can appear to have a handsome balance of payments and trade balance.  For a while there were quite ‘prominent’ politicians, financiers and economists in Europe, who were very proud of this fact and who believed that such a result was actually the goal of all wise economic policies.

Conversely, a booming economy can have an adverse effect on the balance of payments and trade balance, as the demand for imported goods, such as for investment goods, rises.  And after a period of depression, people in employment want to acquire goods again.

These were the factors that led the liberal economists and politicians of the old school to explain again and again that there can be no true economic recovery, which is independent of economic cycle theories.  One of the most remarkable things was that for a long time the prevailing theory of economic science was to describe this coincidental situation as the thing most worth striving for, whereas human effort, prospects and energy were deemed most worthy of condemnation.  There was no harsher criticism for the representative of this liberalist school than if he would have said that the recovery of a country’s economy does not correspond with our ideas about a real trade cycle, and as it is not real, it must collapse.  To me, it sums up the difference between the person who works to earn money and the one who wins it in the lottery.  The same is true when in relation to the economy.  It was incredible how Adolf Hitler dared to heal and strengthen the German economy, going against all experience and principles.  Success should not have happened, as it went against the holy principles of science.  Indeed success was achieved in nine years and further success is expected.

The question now is how the adverse side effects caused by the heating up of the economy can be prevented from affecting external relationships.  The only way is if the control of the state apparatus is strict and reliable, capable of blocking external countries only when there is a risk of imported goods exceeding exports.  In addition, temporary restrictions on tourist visits abroad may be applied, or to ensure that the supply of goods on the internal market is not exhausted.  What has to happen is that the local manufacturer is forced to make a certain proportion of his output available for sale in export markets whatever his circumstances.

Back in 1931 and then again in 1933 we had to give ourselves the opportunity of creating demand in our own market by placing protection around it.  At the start, the effect was only felt in Germany but later the effects were felt internationally.  We certainly could not allow the depression surrounding Germany to affect our economy.

It is good to recall now and again what happened, because the type of foreign currency policy and control that we operate brings with it considerable restrictions and difficulties for the individual.  From my lengthy experience in such internal positions I know full well the ramifications for the free economy, such as the bureaucratic burden and hindrances.  Against that, though, consider all the great successes we have achieved since 1933 with our overall trade policy and internal economic policy: the complete eradication of unemployment, a huge increase in the output of raw materials and finished goods.  These results have to justify the sacrifices that have had to be made.

The other part of our policy has been to carry out a lot of repair work, which has been possible by implementing control of foreign currencies.  This has included everything relating to business with other countries: transfers, transactions, insurance, sea freight, rail freight, post, phone charges, support payments etc.  Equally important are the payments of workers’ savings, which also need to be controlled.

Changes to Trade Policy Caused by the War

The principles of Europe’s trade policy today generally tend to follow along the lines of development as described.  The war has brought an element of change as those countries involved in the war are forced to take central control of import and export and the distribution of raw materials, ensuring supply of vital materials for the economy.  In our 

case, this measure has brought about a steady increase in munitions output.  Germany has managed to solve everything in the space of just two and a half years and this bodes well not only for our future but also the future of other countries fighting alongside us.

The Reversal of the Law of Supply and Demand

During the war negotiations about trade, policy issues have had to be put back to a great extent.  According to the old trade policy it was important to create sales markets i.e. the active person was the one wanting to export, whereas the passive one had to assert himself in order to obtain the goods.  Now, though, the exporter has to fight to sell to the customer, meaning a reversal in the law of supply and demand.

The Question of Labour Deployment in Europe

This is becoming increasingly important for our European policy.  Just as it happened with raw materials, like coal etc., it has been increasingly necessary to achieve a balance in labour i.e. to ‘suck up’ workers in areas of high unemployment and deploy them where there is a lack of manpower.  In Europe, hundreds of thousands of workers have volunteered to move to a job in order to create a balance in Europe.

The Problem of Traffic

This is an important subject for Europe’s trade policy, but one that is affected greatly by the war.  As a result of the difficulties caused for sea freight, Europe’s internal routes and rail freight have become more important.  Establishing whether a raw material is available somewhere and if it can be transported to the required place are equally important matters.  The achievements in this area by the Reich Railway are quite extraordinary, because almost all freight, due to geographical reasons, has to cross Germany in either a north to south direction or east to west.  The lack of freight transported by sea means that Germany’s railway has had to take a lot of it.  Moreover, it should be said that other countries like those in the south-east have made extraordinary achievements in the last year, especially with the advance on Russia.

Effects of the English Blockade on Europe

In this context it is interesting to assess the effects of the blockade on Germany and Europe.  When war broke out our opponents, France and England, lost a large amount of 

their export volume with Germany.  For both sides, significant proportions of their export business were lost.  Besides that, England immediately lost a large part of its European trade while Germany lost the majority of its overseas trade.  Due to the increase in the internal European commerce over the last two and a half years, most countries’ export trade figures have recovered to pre-war levels despite being involved with fewer foreign markets.  However, account needs to be taken of the effect of inflation, say 30%, but even so, the result is that between the European countries (including Germany) the commercial volumes are roughly the same now as before the war.  Germany’s trade with Italy has increased five-fold in the last three years.  This proves one of my earlier points about the benefit of foreign exchange control that it has brought about a greater intensity to our relationships than the slow and difficult way of negotiations and conferences.

Principles of European Co-operation

The European Regional Principle

There is a simple principle that says that what can be bought in Europe should be bought there, just as what can be sold, should be sold in Europe as long as a there is a demand that needs to be met.  If each economy and person follows this principle, then an economic entity can be almost totally created without the need for treaties, agreements etc.

We have signed agreements with sough-east Europe in this regard and a treaty with Romania in 1940 under which Germany has committed to take up Romania’s grain surpluses after the war at prices that are profitable for Romania regardless of world prices.  Other producers of agricultural produce would be treated similarly. Between them, Germany and Italy are able to absorb the entire surplus of grain of Europe.  Overall one can say that in this area Europe is balanced, which means that there is no worry that Europe cannot feed itself or that, like now, intensive agricultural cultures in the south-east have to be reduced because of artificially high prices due to a market change.  An adequate supply for Europe will be assured later by the economic inclusion of and co-operation with Russian areas.

Europe’s Economic Independence

The second principle of economic co-operation in Europe is this: Europe has to be made economically independent enough for it to live.  It would be too idealistic to believe that Europe can live the same way as it did with free trade, if it wanted to make itself economically independent.  That has never been the idea of a European community and nor should it ever be.

The essence of this principle of European co-operation is that all nations of Europe and its economic scientists must endeavour to ensure that Europe is never forced to starve again by a power outside Europe.  For Europe’s fate in future, this may be more important than whether its equipment is one or two points stronger or weaker than its enemy.  One could believe that the possibility of an attack on Europe would no longer exist, if certain powers outside Europe ceased to say: we (the non-Europeans) lack the military might of the old nations of Europe, those bearers of military virtues and traditions, and geographically we are not in a position to conquer Europe, if it is unified, but we have always got the possibility to force Europe to starve and regardless of all else.  War or no war, victory or defeat, sometime this Europe will become noticed.

Therefore the most important thing for the security of all of Europe that has to come out of this war is that it no foreign force can threaten it.  What Europe will do with its new-won freedom is a question, which its people have to decide among themselves.  The fundamental thing is that it, at last, achieves independence for itself.

Europe and the Global Economy

The third principal issue concerning Europe’s fate its external relationship.  The view is often heard that it would detract from Europe’s position in the world economy if such a process of ‘intensification’ in Europe took place.  This view is false because large economic entities have always proved to be stronger and more productive than small ones.  It is an old low of physics that states that the sum of all the parts is stronger than the individual parts and this applies to politics as it does to other things, especially the economy.

Until the advent of the Customs Union, Germany was an economic area split up into over one hundred small areas.  To travel from Berlin to Cologne meant crossing 20 or 25 boundaries, so no one can say today that Germany has not become a stronger economic unit by abolishing its internal boundaries - quite the opposite. Between 1800 and 1836 when the Customs Union was introduced Germany was relatively uninteresting economically to the world.  When capitalism in England created the large modern factories, we were way behind.  The upswing came here when the Customs Union created the first step to forming an entity and List wrote his genial work. The step towards an economic entity was also towards a political one.  From 1876 onwards, Germany’s position in Europe and the world grew, which would have been unthinkable if its internal boundaries had not been abolished.

The USA is another example of a large economic area coming together to create a strong economy with purchasing power and export possibilities.  It could never be what it is today if there were still the 13 independent states.  Its economic strength and interest in the world stems from the creation of this large economic area.  This should hold true in the future and closer economic ties in Europe should lead to a strengthening of the European area in relation to other continents, just as Germany’s economic fusion led to stronger German commerce.  Furthermore, purchasing power throughout Europe will grow, so there will be no worry whether Europe will be  interesting as a partner for the rest of the world.

I have already established that Europe should not become independent in the sense that it can meet all of its own requirements, rather Europe should be shaped so that it cannot be starved of food or raw materials.  As long as it can produce a minimum level on which to exist, the surfeit can be used for export purposes outside Europe when living standards rise.

Internal Pre-Conditions of a European Economic Community

Having handled Europe’s global position and the most important principles for closer economic co-operation in Europe, I want to take the perspective of our partners in Europe.

It is known that people tend to be reticent when they are faced with economic change and it is remarkable to note the number of great revolutionary minds and pioneers that there were in our economy and other economies while the official opinion still remained conservative.

When Bremen joined the Customs Union, the view prevailed for many years there that its trade would die.  We can remember how long Bremen remained an outsider in the Customs Union because the local people preferred the city to act as a temporary bonded-warehouse facility for American goods en route, say, to Norway, rather than the consignment having to enter the German customs area.  Instead, Bremen should have acted as the port for all of the 80-100million people.

When in 1931 the Customs Union of Germany and Austria was planned despite the obstacle of the French ‘diktat’, there were many brave German souls in Vienna at the time that told me that it would be the ruin of Austria.  In 1938 I made a point of reminding them of their words when unemployment disappeared, when most factories doubled their pay rolls, when the only concern was about raw materials and building enough factories.

Despite the Austrian experience, there are still those who say that it is impossible to run an economy if it is incorporated in a customs union where there is a powerful industry like Germany’s.  The mistake is in believing that the new conditions would be the same before and that it would be difficult for the small nation to survive next to the larger one with its production capabilities.  It is amazing that the experts in the small economy lack the imagination to see that it then forms part of a large economy.  In discussions about the problem of European integration we always come across these limitations in the thinking process.

The issue of foreign currency control is going to be an important question for the shaping of economic life in Europe.  In my introduction I broadly described the development that led to today’s trade policy and how foreign currency control began as an emergency measure and ended up being an effective tool for controlling foreign trade.  Even today duties or contingencies play no part.  Instead the transaction control is the only trade control used between countries.  When someone talks about a future Europe this is the most important thing.  The removal of duties is not so important, as it plays no significant part today, but it may regain importance at a later stage.  I am convinced that in the foreseeable future we will no longer have what was called foreign currency transactions.  I fully welcome that because the disadvantages of it, such as loss of planned control of the economy, would be greater than the possible advantages to be gained by individuals.

On the other hand, it is worth trying to loosen a little the tight mesh in which economies exist today.  Today we have got to a point where we have created bilateral treaties that effectively guarantee all transactions.  During the war only a few items, such as luxury ones, were excluded.  At discussions abroad I am frequently confronted with objections to European co-operation that are quite irrelevant.  The war is obviously the base cause of such thoughts, but certain effects of it have nothing to do with European co-operation, instead they are to do with the war and the blockade.  The main difficulties cited are to do with raw material supply evidenced by shortages and food rationing.  In fact, the European economy is the weapon against this blockade.  If we have failed to remove the effects of the blockade today, then the successes we have had so far are thanks to the joint efforts of all the nations of Europe.

It is wrong to believe that the present shortages are related to European planning, instead they would be worse without it.  Freedom will return more and more after the war, so, although we may still have foreign currency controls to some degree, it will be possible to travel, live and trade in Europe as we did before the time of controls.  In the European system we will have a form of clearing that evens out the peaks.  For the individual interested in this for his commercial needs and activities, a situation is almost re-created which is barely different from the situation of free foreign currency control.

Ways to Achieve European Co-operation

At the start I mention that we National Socialists are not particularly enamoured of collective international conferences.  Over the last twenty years I have participated in many international negotiations with various European nations.  Many were fruitless, others just initial ones or attempts to negotiate; but one thing is certain and that is that the ones that had a positive outcome were those trying to achieve co-operation between one state and another, rather than collective ones.

By creating a network of nations in Europe co-operating with one another, a fabric is formed.  This fabric is stronger than a so-called skeleton agreement with certain principles containing a list of provisos, rendering its actual application no more than an illusion.  From an intensive one to one relationship it will be possible to move on to three-way treaties and to reach compromises between the individual nations.  By carefully bringing about bilateral treaties, Europe will slowly start to distance itself from the outside world with which close treaties concerning goods, foreign exchange and traffic will not be excluded.

Over the years Germany has endeavoured repeatedly to form friendly agreements with lots of governments.  A good example of this is the one with south-east Europe, with whom we have tried to form a compromise and a closer tie since 1933.  Our desire was to prevent the farmer in the south-east from living in poverty, and a condition unworthy of the whole European economy.

I believe that Adolf Hitler’s great actions to save the German farmer will go down in the annals of history and also that people in Europe will start to realise how he also saved the European farmer.

I know that we are still not yet able to bring the farmer in the south-east of Europe up to the level of the one in the north where the economy is more intensive and prices and living standards are higher.  However, a start has been made with changes visible in villages in the south-east where wealth has grown, livestock has increased and production is more intensive.  I believe too that we will elevate Europe in general to a level higher than ever before.

When we started this policy in 1932/33 we came across a lot of resistance, scepticism and distrust, not only in Germany.  Two treaties, one with Hungary in February and with Yugoslavia in May 1934, set standards in the agricultural sector.  These were the first 

treaties in which we granted unilateral preferences and it is clear that we have to pursue further the route of compromise.

Let us now take a look at certain very wealthy countries in the north of Europe.  There one sometimes hears the argument that things are so good with them that Europe would have to come up to their level first.  It is clear that that cannot be the objective of a community-led European economic policy.  Marxism got it wrong in that it did nothing to elevate those lower down the order, whereas a social economy, in our sense, should use all the appropriate measures to elevate the lower social classes.  In the same way, the European economic community has the aim of elevating those countries left behind economically due to historical, geographic or climactic reasons to the level of the other countries.  Just as has happened up to now, it will become apparent that the only country that contributes to the scheme will itself benefit from it more and more.  The overall effect will be a strengthening of Europe’s position in the global economy.  

We Germans are convinced that this outcome of European economic co-operation and economic isolationism will be, and must be, one of the most significant results of the war.  We also believe and hope that people from Europe, who without exception are fighting on our side, will work together with us in the same spirit to achieve a new European economic structure.  One thing is certain: a truly peaceful European economy can only come about through voluntary and joyful co-operation between all participating nations.  The aim of a war cannot be to achieve something in this area with force and violence, but it can be the objective of our statesmen to act as preparers of the way, pointing out the opportunities to be gained from building a European economy.  After the war they will leave others to construct and extend this home where there is voluntary co-operation between all the nations.  The project’s success rests on every nation’s belief that such a development is in their interest as well as Germany’s, so that a European policy (not just of one nation) is pursued, which at the same time serves the good of each individual nation.

THE END OF CLODIUS’S essay.

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